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ABSTRACT
Modern airline pilots are tasked every flight with the safe and efficient 
operation of highly automated airliners in today’s complicated global 
and economic environments.  Airlines have developed standard 
operating procedures (SOP) for normal, abnormal, and emergency 
operations.  These procedures serve as a script for crews to follow.  These 
procedures are designed by airlines to ensure that aircraft are operated in 
the (1) most safe, (2) most efficient, and (3) most on-time manner.  For the 
most part pilots will comply with SOP, but when they (1) don’t agree with 
SOP, (2) don’t understand SOP or the risks associated with not complying 
with SOP, or (3) don’t feel adequately trained to know what SOP is, it is 
difficult to motivate them to comply.  Airlines have the means to measure 
compliance through Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Line 
Operations Safety Audit (LOSA).  The purpose of this research is to 
determine if increased understanding, knowledge and awareness of the 
risk of non compliance with SOP increase airline pilots’ compliance with 
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SOP.   This research explores data from line checks at a major US airline 
that was gathered in pursuit of understanding what drives SOP 
compliance.  Baseline data was gathered and analyzed to determine the 
top 12 non compliant items.  The airline provided training during the 
Human Factors module in each pilots recurrent training on Pilot Intentional 
Non Compliance (PINC).  The training including developing pilots’ 
understanding that while most Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) 
reports grant pilots immunity from legal action, if a violation is labeled 
PINC, ASAP protections do not apply.  Further line checks were 
conducted after the pilots received the PINC training.  The top 12 non 
compliant items from the pre-PINC training group were compared to the 
same 12 items in the post-PINC training group.  Significant improvement in 
SOP compliance was found in six of the 12 items tested.  The results 
established that training pilots on the risk of PINC did significantly increase 
SOP compliance. 
ix
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
 ”Why?  Because I said so.”  For the general population, these words 
provide very little motivation to comply with a request.  However, in the 
black and white world of aviation, pilots are trained to follow the rules 
simply because they are the rules and the rules were made to be 
followed, and because the FAA and company policies and procedures 
“said so.”   
 Checklists are completed step by step on every flight.  Procedures 
for normal, abnormal and emergency operations are carefully developed 
and pilots are trained to followed them precisely.  In fact, creative 
solutions are simply not allowed unless every other option has failed, a 
situation that has rarely been encountered in modern airline flying. 
 In normal day-to-day line operations, SOP allow pilots who have 
never worked together before or perhaps even met each other before to 
safely operate complex flights. According to Dismukes, Berman and 
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Loukopoulos (2007), “These written scripts establish the correct way to 
perform procedures and provide standardization across pilots. 
Standardization is crucial” (p. 2).  Crews of two to four pilots are often 
brought together for the first time an hour before departure time and are 
expected to work together to provide the most safe, comfortable and 
profitable flight possible.  Each pilot has a role and a script, and ideally, if 
SOP is followed, there should be very few surprises in normal, abnormal or 
emergency operations. 
 The knowledge of pilots’ compulsion to comply with rules and 
regulations leaves airlines struggling to understand why Line Operations 
Safety Audits (LOSA) and Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) 
show that pilots are not dutifully complying with all Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOP).  Several recent incidents and accidents point directly 
to deviation from SOP as a primary cause. 
 In the fatal crash in Buffalo, NY of Continental Connection Flight 
3701, a Bombardier Q400 that was operated by Colgan Air, the NSTB 
found that: 
 Contributing factors included his [pilot’s] failure to monitor other 
 warning signals of the plane's slowing speed, and violation of ‘sterile 
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 cockpit’ rules against casual conversation at low altitudes. The 
 board also said Colgan had failed to spell out adequate 
 procedures for crews to monitor air speed when icing is a risk 
 (Trumbell, 2010, p. 90). 
In the fatal crash of a Northwest Airlink ferry flight of a Bombardier CRJ-200 
operated by Pinnacle Airlines: 
 The NTSB determined that the ‘unprofessional behavior, deviation 
 from standard operating procedures and poor airmanship’ of 
 Pinnacle Flight 3701's two-man crew led to the crash of the regional 
 jet (Fiorino, 2007, p. 25). 
The wingtip damage of an American Airlines MD-82 on Flight 1402 was a 
nonfatal event in Charlotte, NC, where: 
 A big question facing investigators is whether American's basic 
 operational rules and procedures were followed.  If complications 
 crop up once an aircraft descends below 1,000 feet on an 
 instrument approach, pilots generally are trained to break off the 
 descent, gain altitude and circle back for another landing (Paztor, 
 2009, p. A6).  
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And, the investigation into the nonfatal crash of Continental Airlines Flight 
1404, a 737-500 in Denver, CO, that departed the runway midfield during 
takeoff found that: 
 The captain’s use of the nosewheel steering tiller was contrary to 
 company procedures and neither of these late control inputs was 
 an effective method for turning the airplane at high speed. The 
 NTSB concludes that the captain’s use of tiller and full right control 
 wheel in the 3 seconds before the excursion likely resulted from 
 acute stress stemming from a sudden, unexpected threat, 
 perceived lack of control, and extreme time pressure (National 
 Transportation Safety Board, 2010, p. 44). 
These accidents and incidents clearly illustrate the importance of 
compliance with SOP.  
 It is the airline’s responsibility to ensure SOP are safe and their pilots 
understand and able to comply with current SOP.  Clearly, the pilot’s 
choice to deviate from or disregard SOP creates risk for the airline, 
passengers and crewmembers.  According to Federal Aviation 
Regulations (FAR) and Airline Operation Specifications (Ops Specs), it is 
the pilot’s obligation to comply (FAR/AIM 2011).  This paper intends to 
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explore the reasons for noncompliance and the effects of specific 
initiatives designed by airlines to improve pilots’ compliance with SOP.
Literature Review
 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are written, published and 
tested procedures that are expected to be universally and consistently 
applied within an organization.  Further definition explains that SOP should 
identify and describe the standard tasks and duties of a flight crew for 
each flight phase, including what to do and when to do it.  Also, SOP 
should be simple, clear, concise and prescriptive (Aviation Glossary, 2010).  
 From the early days of ab initio training, modern airline pilots are 
trained in the use of checklists and other procedures defined as SOP.  
From the moment a crew is brought together in the flight planning room 
until the cockpit door is locked and post-flight procedures are completed, 
a very specific series of steps are taken to dictate interactions between 
crew members.  Furthermore, abnormal and emergency procedures are 
defined with specific protocol to ensure the best possible outcome of an 
unexpected circumstance.  
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 FAR 121.533 is directly quoted in airline operating manuals and 
states “the Captain shall operate in accordance with FARs, Ops Specs 
[SIC] and airline procedures and policies except under circumstances 
provided for in FAR 121.557 [Captain’s emergency authority]” (FAR/AIM 
2011).  Furthermore, operating manuals assign the Captain with the duty 
of ensuring the timely completion and accurate adherence to checklist 
procedures (Flight Operations Manual, 2011).  When the Ops Specs 
provide SOP that are simple, clear, concise and prescriptive it is easy for a 
Captain to understand how to comply.  However, sometimes SOP are not 
easy to understand and apply, and that makes compliance difficult 
(Dismukes et al., 2007).
 Airlines have long relied on protocol in the form of Standard 
Operating Procedures to coordinate and execute safe flights, and many 
other high-risk industries have followed the example set by airlines when 
developing their own SOP.  For example, the medical field defers to 
airlines’ extensive experience and success with SOP and often uses airline 
SOP as a pattern for their own.  According to Pape (2003), “The key to 
preventing medication errors lies within adopting protocols from other 
safety focused industries.  The airline industry, for example, has methods in 
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place that improve pilot’s focus and provide a milieu of safety when 
human life is at stake” (p. 91). 
 The overriding rules for airline operations are made by the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), but SOP is carefully developed by each 
airline to take the airline beyond safety to improve efficiencies and 
reduce surprises in the cockpit.  Sukenik (1998) found that, “Adhering to 
SOP leads to a maximum utility and, thus, to greater flight safety than 
deviating from it, even if an alternative procedure is equivalent as far as 
safety is concerned or seems to lead to greater utility” (p. 405).  The 
airlines want their pilots to follow SOP because it has been proven to 
increase safety and save money.  Furthermore, FAR 121.533 states that 
pilots are obligated by their certificates to follow the FARs, put safety first, 
and to follow their respective operation specifications, also known as SOP 
(FAR/AIM, 2011).
 Beyond the regulations, studies show that SOP should be adhered 
to in a pilot’s pursuit of individual safety.  Baker (2007) analyzed the effects 
of SOP compliance and found that, “Within an airline, management, 
operations, maintenance, training, equipment, and pilots must all be 
aligned.  Accidents occur when breakdowns arise in the interactions of 
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these components” (p. 186).  Simply put, strict adherence to SOP helps 
each individual involved with the operation of a flight know what to 
expect.  Baker’s research showed clearly that, while SOP are not perfect, 
compliance with SOP make airlines safer, and noncompliance can lead 
to aircraft incidents and accidents.  Furthermore, in analysis of 19 U.S. 
Airline accidents in the period of 1990-2000, Dismukes, et al. (2007) found 
inadequate execution of highly practiced normal procedures under 
challenging conditions and deviation from explicit guidance or SOP as 
two of six common themes underlying the NTSB’s label “pilot error” as an 
accident cause or contributing factor.  The authors felt noncompliance 
due to a lack of understanding or execution of SOP or blatant disregard 
for SOP are key problems that airlines must acknowledge and address in 
any attempts to increase SOP compliance.
 
Advanced Qualification Programs
 In 1994 United Airlines Training Center developed the first Advanced 
Qualification Program (AQP) for the Boeing 737-300.  United began 
operating the Boeing 777 in 1995 and all training on that aircraft has been 
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accomplished under AQP (Federal Aviation Administration, 1991).  This 
alternate method of training allows for more cost-effective training with 
the goal of increasing operator proficiency (Taylor & Emanuel, 2000).  
Today in 2011 nearly all major U.S. airlines, along with growing number of 
U.S. regional airlines, participate in this voluntary program.
 The purpose of AQP is to encourage the use of innovative 
technologies, training and evaluation features to improve training 
performance.  These programs are systematically developed, 
continuously maintained, and empirically validated proficiency-based 
training systems (Federal Aviation Administration, 1991).  
 During a pilot’s career, they will experience initial (new-hire), 
transition (new airplane type), upgrade (new seat) and recurrent training.  
Recurrent training consists of simulator training to proficiency, along with 
14 “part 121-mandated-training requirements...Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) and human factors” (Hughes, 1995, p. 27).  Pilots are 
trained on the proper execution of SOP for all phases of flight in normal, 
abnormal and emergency operations.  Evaluations are designed to 
ensure that understanding of SOP is demonstrated before the pilot is 
qualified for line operations.  Once qualified on an aircraft, a pilot 
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experiences training at least once a year under AQP.  Additional training 
requirements are met through computer-based exams.  
 Once every 24 months each Captain is required to experience a 
line check.  The term “line operations” refers normal flights during regularly 
scheduled trips, so a line check is an observation of a pilot during line 
operations (Klinect, Helmreich, Murray, & Merritt, 2003).  During these line 
checks a check airman observes the Captain in line operations and 
assesses SOP compliance.  These line checks are jeopardy events, 
meaning the pilot must pass or be removed from line flying for training to 
resolve deficient areas.  Some of the Microscope Line Checks (MLC) 
referred to later in this study were done during routine line checks required 
by AQP.
  As mentioned above, AQP requires airline pilots to be trained in 
crew resource management (CRM).  CRM is defined as a set of principles 
that pilots and others are taught to use to make effective use of all 
available resources – human, equipment and information.  Interaction 
and coordination among team members are emphasized (Dismukes, 
2007).  In the event SOP are not being followed or are in question, CRM 
training helps to increase each pilot’s ability to communicate the 
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discrepancy, regardless of position in the cockpit.  First Officers are 
responsible to speak up if any other crew member, including the Captain, 
is not in compliance with SOP.  
 Helmreich (2001) discusses the specific skills that CRM training 
provides to countermeasures against risks and errors.   The author explains 
how these skills equip pilots to be more alert and vocal about threats and 
impending errors, including the ability to better detect errors and manage 
their resolution.  
Pilot Personalities
 According to Bartram (1995), there are many commonalities in 
personality type between the airline pilot applicant and the pilots 
operating aircraft being flown by airlines today.  Those who become 
airline pilots have similar personalities, and little difference exists in the 
traits of those trained in the military versus purely civilian trained pilots.  
However, it is important to understand that pilots’ interests and methods of 
approaching crew coordination vary as personalities range across the 
general population (Chidester, 1991).  
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 Research shows that the pilot population is commonly wired for 
success because they must be driven to make it into their highly 
competitive business, and that commonality groups them together. As a 
group, pilots score significantly more intelligent, emotionally stable, and 
mature in comparison to the general population norms (Wakcher, 2003).  
For risk assessment, pilots are trained (often times through experience) to 
make good decisions in all circumstances, and risk-management is a skill 
that improves with experience (Hunter, 2002).  Also, as their experience 
increases, pilots are less likely to be involved in a violation of any Federal 
Aviation Regulations (Rebok, Qiang, Baker, McCarthy & Li, 2005).   
 
Learning Theory
  Airline pilots today are trained in a variety of learning environments, 
including classroom, simulator, computer based modules and line 
operations.  Once initial training is completed, recurrent training is 
accomplished in all of these environments to refresh already developed 
skills and ensure understanding of changes to SOP.   
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 Since the purpose of this research is to evaluate experienced pilots’ 
compliance with SOP, it is important to understand how pilots learn 
following initial training.  Pilots are always building on experience, whether 
it is with a new airplane, a new procedure, or a new role.  While each new 
learning experience presents challenges of different degrees, professional 
pilots are expected to perform well in all aspects of training as it is part of 
their job.  Each new training experience begins with transfer of learning 
from a pilot’s previous experience, and in order for the training to be 
effective the pilot must overcome, agree with the new procedure and 
become proficient at executing it.  In line operations, pilots are expected 
to adopt and comply with company prescribed SOP.  This requires pilots to 
overcome any bias, including any personal dislike or disagreement with 
SOP (Dismukes et al., 2007).   
 All procedural changes require the creation or alteration of SOP 
and the training for pilots to understand what is now expected of them.  
Clearly, the airlines are very experienced and very good at making SOP 
for all areas of operation, and as new procedures are implemented, a 
checklist normally accompanies them (Sukenik, 1998).  
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 For example, the beginnings of the FAA’s NextGen implementation 
have included the development for Required Navigation Performance 
Area Navigation (RNAV-RNP) approach procedures.  Each airline seeking 
FAA approval to fly RNAV-RNP approaches has developed their SOP for 
how the approaches will be loaded into the Flight Management 
Computer (FMC), briefed by the pilot flying (PF), flown by the PF, and what 
steps will be taken by the pilot monitoring (PM).  All pilots are trained on 
the specific procedures in initial, transition, upgrade and recurrent training 
before they are qualified to fly RNAV-RNP approached in line operations.  
In most cases pilots are given a checklist or some other sort of tool to 
guide them through the steps to fly an RNAV-RNP approach in the 
company specified manner.  
 The concern arises when the FAA sets the minimums for training 
requirements, and the standards are influenced by cost cutting initiatives.   
Dismukes et al. (2007) found “inadequate knowledge or experience 
provided by training and/or guidance” (p. 298) was a factor in a third of 
the 19 accidents studied.  A critical component of these accidents 
involved pilots who found themselves in “challenging situations for which 
they had received training, but the experience they received from that 
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training was of inadequate fidelity to the actual situation, inadequately 
detailed, or incomplete” (p. 298).   In these accidents the authors 
discovered the pilots completed the training, but the airlines’ efforts to 
ensure that pilots understood SOP to the point they would be comfortable 
executing new procedures simply fell short.  The authors go on to explain 
that if airlines were more aware of the limitations of their training, they 
could make modifications and train pilots to make well thought out 
decisions that utilize SOP based on their solid understanding of how to 
apply the new SOP to real-life situations.
Aeronautical Decision Making
 It was long believed pilot’s decision-making was based on analysis 
performed by considering a range of solutions, evaluating each option to 
determine how each would affect the flight, then choosing the best 
option.  This decision tree is known as the Rational Choice method (Klein, 
2000).  Klein explains further that pilots simply don’t have the time to 
consider all options in situations where an instant decision must be made.  
Because of the time pressure to make a decision, pilots often look for the 
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first workable option.  The best rules can be rendered useless when 
conditions or circumstances never considered become a pilot’s present 
reality.  
 Research shows that when faced with a decision, experienced 
pilots will normally make a choice based on the circumstances they 
understand, and unless there is a good reason to change course, they will 
press on.  This is not a stubborn act, but instead it demonstrates a pilot’s 
keen ability to assess a situation and decide how to respond.  This skill, also 
known as situational awareness (SA) is the ability to identify one’s position 
in relation to other aircraft in a flight environment.  A pilot with good SA will 
“comprehend the various forces that are acting on the airplane and will 
be able to anticipate how these forces will shape the future course of the 
airplane” (Klein, 2000, p. 173).  Pilots are not likely to consider many 
options and choose the best, as Rational Choice would imply.  Instead 
pilots use experience to make a decision, and only if there is time for 
additional consideration and the wisdom of their current choice becomes 
questionable will they seek out other solutions (Klein, 2000).
 Airline training departments are tasked with training pilots with a 
broad range of experience.  Therefore, if experience is a required 
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component of good decision-making, the natural and accurate 
conclusion is that the most common reason for poor decisions is a lack of 
experience (Klein, 2000).  Understanding how pilots learn and make 
decisions is key to developing training on SOP.  SOP is developed not 
necessarily to bring pilots to the best choice, based on the pilot’s 
experience, but to the prescribed choice.  An example is the Quick 
Reference Handbook (QRH), which is part of the Aircraft Flight Manual 
(AFM) approved by the FAA, and is used to guide pilots through abnormal 
and emergency procedures.  
 For example, abnormal findings often have prescribed procedures 
in the QRH.  It contains checklists and decision trees that assist a pilot in 
understanding what each specific system failure means and what 
decisions need to be made.  Under SOP, pilots are expected to respond 
to an abnormal findings by accomplishing immediate action items 
associated with their condition (if any) and then referring to the QRH.  
Pilots are expected to accomplish the QRH - exactly as written - unless 
there is some reason why the Captain determines it would be safer to act 
otherwise.  Any decision to act outside the protocol defined by SOP falls 
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under the realm of Captain’s emergency authority (Aircraft Operating 
Manual, 2010).  
 The problem occurs when a pilot possesses prior experience is 
better understood than the current SOP.  This experiential knowledge may 
be the basis of the pilot’s first choice and the choice they continue with 
unless it becomes unsafe to proceed.  If pilots are less familiar with SOP 
than they are with a procedure they have tested and know to be safe, 
they are unlikely to trust SOP when faced with decision making in 
abnormal or emergency situations (Dismukes et al., 2007).  This is why it is 
so critical for airlines to train their pilots in all SOP, ensuring that they 
understand and trust the SOP and they understand that any deviation 
from SOP outside of an emergency situation is a violation of their 
certificate (Dismukes et al., 2007).  
Line Operations Safety Audit
 Besides the AQP required line checks, airlines employ a safety tool 
known as Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA).  These cockpit 
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observations are similar to line checks as they are gathered during normal 
flight operations, but their purpose is different:
In the most general of terms, LOSA is similar to getting your 
cholesterol checked during a routine examination. The test, usually 
performed as a preventive measure, provides evidence of risk on 
having a heart attack or other serious health event.  The results 
themselves do not provide a solution but can prompt a person to 
make healthier lifestyle choices. A person might also choose to do 
nothing and carry on as normal. Either way, the person learned 
something and is responsible for change.  LOSA is the same. It 
provides a diagnostic snapshot of safety performance. It uses 
cockpit observations collected in normal operations to provide a 
profile of safety strengths and weaknesses. Similarly, the onus is on 
the airline to respond to the data and make change if necessary, in 
order to prevent an incident or accident.  (Klinect et al., 2003)
Like AQP, these line checks are voluntary.  
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Flight Operational Quality Assurance
 Flight Operational Quality Assurance, or FOQA, is another voluntary 
safety program approved by the FAA for commercial airline use allowing 
commercial airlines and pilots to share de-identified information with the 
FAA.  The FAA can use this information to monitor national trends in aircraft 
operations and prescriptively apply resources to address operational risk 
issues (Longridge, 2003).   Like ASAP, this information is de-identified and 
voluntarily disclosed to the FAA by the airlines in cooperation with the 
union.  This information is electronically generated through a Flight Data 
Acquisition Unit, or FDAU, that works along with the Flight Data Recorder 
(FDR) to record specific flight parameters.   This information is collected 
and downloaded through the Aircraft Communications Addressing and 
Reporting System (ACARS) that sends the desired parameters as digital 
information to the Gatekeeper.  The Gatekeeper is typically a union 
official who is the only person with the ability to link the collected data to 
the specific flight and therefore individual crewmembers (Holtom, 2006).
 The information gathered for the FOQA program is analyzed for three 
main purposes: exceedence analysis, statistical analysis, and validated 
trend information (Federal Aviation Administration, 2004).  Exceedence 
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data would include any flight parameter outside of the normal operating 
envelope for normal operations, for instance a roll angle of greater than 
45 degrees.  Normal operations would not require more than 30 degrees 
of bank, and while 45 degrees of roll is not necessarily a dangerous flight 
attitude, it is outside the normal flight parameters.  The gatekeeper can 
use this FOQA data to determine the exact time, altitude and phase of 
flight to understand if this was a momentary exceedence or if this was a 
trend.  If there is a reported bank of 60 degrees or more, the gatekeeper 
might choose to conduct a more detailed investigation of the event  
(FAA, 2004).
 Statistical data can be used to identify trends at a given airline that 
might be useful for improving operations and refining procedures.  For 
example, an airline might notice through FOQA data that ATC requests to 
maintain higher airspeeds on arrival are resulting in a high occurrence of 
unstabilized approaches leading to go-arounds.  This information might 
influence an adjustment to current procedures resulting in better 
managed approaches, thereby increasing the number of stabilized 
approaches leading to successful landings.
 Validated trend information is used to ensure all required 
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maintenance action is completed if there is an unreported exceedence.  
For example, if an aircraft limitation is exceeded a maintenance 
inspection is required.  If the exceedence is not entered into the aircraft 
logbook for any reason, FOQA exceedence data will trigger an 
inspection.  The gatekeeper can link the data to the flight and follow up 
with the flight crew to understand the circumstances of the event (FAA, 
2004).
ASAP
 The first ASAP program was started at American Airlines (AA) in 1994.  
It was an agreement between the airline, the union, and the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA).  The program was modeled after NASA’s 
Aviation Safety Reporting Program (ASRP), a program that allowed pilots 
to disclose safety violations without risk of punishment.  The NASA program 
was good, but the airlines were only able to access a limited amount of 
data and unable to gain the specific information necessary to improve 
the safety of their operations.  The ASAP program was developed for an 
18-month trial period with this goal in mind:
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The objectives of the American Airlines Aviation Safety Action 
Program are to prevent accidents and incidents.  The means 
by which we accomplish these objectives are by identifying 
flight safety concerns and achieving corrective action.  
Consequently, ASAP analyzes risks, increases education and 
awareness, validates program effectiveness, measures system 
performance and ensures accountability.  As a result, a 
successful ASAP should help to increase employee 
compliance with the FARs.  The scope of events that are 
considered under ASAP includes any observation that 
highlights a potential flight safety concern.  The actions taken 
in this program reflect the desire of all parties to solve 
problems through corrective action and education.  ASAP 
combines essential self- reporting elements of previous self-
reporting programs and provides solutions to the identified 
hazards in order to prevent incidents and accidents (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2009, p. 20)
 The program was recognized early in its existence as very forward 
thinking.  This statement from then CEO Don Carty was made in the 
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presence of President Clinton, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and union 
officials as they met when American Airlines' ASAP Program was honored 
At White House in 2000:  
The ASAP program is a model of what can be done when business, 
labor and an enlightened government agency work together 
positively.  Without question, the outstanding leadership of Jane 
Garvey at the FAA has allowed this and other safety initiatives to 
thrive. (American Airlines Press Release, 2000, p. 1)
 After the 18-month trial the program was made permanent at AA.  
Since then ASAP programs have been adopted at most U.S. Airlines.  
Programs have also been implemented for mechanics, flight attendants 
and dispatchers.  The program encourages workers to “voluntarily report 
any incident that might raise a safety concern or any circumstances 
where safety might have been compromised” (American Airlines Press 
Release, 2000, p. 1).  From these reports the airlines are able to gather 
information that otherwise may have not been reported if the risk of 
punishment existed. 
 There are certain events that are reported that are not covered 
under ASAP’s umbrella of protection. "In instances involving possible 
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criminal activity, substance abuse, controlled substances, alcohol, or 
intentional falsification the terms of confidentiality contained in this MOU 
do not apply” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009, p. 14).  In the event 
an excluded event is reported the Event Review Team (ERT) must turn over 
that information to the FAA and law enforcement, as appropriate 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2009).  While most reports grant 
employees immunity from legal action, there are certain cases where 
ASAP protections do not apply:
It's not supposed to be a ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ card for outrageous, 
unsafe, unprofessional behavior. Instead, it is supposed to allow 
good people to report on mistakes they've made without being 
punished -- mistakes that otherwise would go unreported and 
uncorrected.  (Maxon, 2008, p. 1)  
PINC and PUNC
 James Huntzinger, the former Vice President of Safety, Security & 
Compliance at Korean Air has been credited with coining the terms 
Procedural Intentional Noncompliance (PINC) and Procedural 
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Unintentional Noncompliance (PUNC) (Agur, 2007).  Quite simply, these 
acronyms are used to label behavior as pilots’ unintentional or intentional 
deviation from company prescribed SOP.
 The Air Safety Foundation reported that a review of accidents 
involving professionally flown aircraft shows that four out of five events 
included PINC or PUNC by pilots.  Additionally, “PINCs and PUNCs are 
reduced dramatically when an effective safety culture exists.” (Agur, 2007, 
p. 13).  One might conclude that the way to reduce PINCs and PUNCs is 
to increase the effectiveness of the safety culture at an airline.  Simple as 
that sounds, U.S. major airlines are already incredibly safe and have 
effective safety cultures in place (Snyder, 2007).  Moreover, “on a typical 
American airline, your chances of dying on a flight are somewhere 
around one in 13 million.” (Maxa, 2009, p. 1)  
 It has already been established that airline safety records are 
commendable and current regulations motivate operators to avoid 
situations where they could be violated by the FAA.  The question as to 
why PINC and PUNC are surfacing as causes of aircraft incidents, 
accidents and as a contributing factor on ASAP reports remains.  
Huntzinger (2006) summarized the following: 
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What's interesting is that PINC events typically involve crews who 
have been flying most of their adult lives — veteran aviators who 
train on simulators once or twice a year; attend initial and then 
recurrent training classes that cover procedures, FARs, limitations 
and other best practices; practice CRM; ride with check airmen; 
and so on. In short, they clearly know the rules and regulations, yet 
they intentionally violate them. (p. 42)
 Huntzinger describes the three elements of a PINC event as: (1) a 
reward for the violator; (2) knowledge of the associated risk; (3) 
consideration of how ones peers will react.  If a pilot is able to determine 
that, for example, the reward of an on-time arrival (getting to the layover 
hotel sooner) is worth the risk of an unstabilized approach (that by SOP 
should result in a go-around) and in their opinion they determine that 
continuing the approach and landing would be considered safe enough 
by their peers, even if it violates SOP, and even though they know better, 
their safe enough landing has all the elements required for PINC.  “They 
[PINC] are often the result of well-meaning pilots trying to do their job but 
willfully taking risks to achieve what should be a secondary goal, 
‘completing the mission.’” (Agur, 2007, p. 36)
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 PUNC can be considered a SOP violation that is less deliberate in 
nature, but it is the result of a lack of information or understanding that 
results in a pilot unknowingly violating SOP.  The pilot is responsible to 
comply with company SOP, and the airline is responsible to train the pilots 
who operate their aircraft.  An effective airline safety culture strives to 
inform pilots of ever evolving SOP, but this is not an easy task.  Anthony 
(2009) summarizes: “Aviation is inherently a dynamic and ever-changing 
industry that is constantly producing hazards even as it strives to reduce 
them” (p. 42).  The task of finishing the work of SOP development so that 
pilots can be perfectly informed of SOP is never complete, and PUNC is 
often the result of a lack of training by the company and thereby pilot’s 
efficiency in understanding of SOP. 
Safety Culture
 According to Reason (1998), “Safety cultures evolve gradually in 
response to local conditions, past event, the character of the leadership 
and the mood of the workforce” (p. 293). Research has already 
established that it is in a professional pilot’s nature to comply with the 
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rules, and that they do not want to be charged with PINC or PUNC 
(Rebok, 2008).  They are already naturally resistant to risky behavior, yet 
these pilots are not perfectly compliant with SOP.  If an ideal safety culture 
is needed to drive airlines to a sustainable condition of SOP compliance 
“regardless of the leadership’s personality or current commercial 
concerns” (Reason, 1998, p. 294), what can already safe airlines do to 
positively affect their safety cultures and increase compliance?  
 When looking to the root cause of forces that drive ‘rule followers’ 
to become ‘rule breakers’, research shows that if there is a lack of 
understanding of what unacceptable behavior is, unacceptable 
behavior will happen (e.g., PUNC).  If there is a lack of understanding of 
the consequences of unacceptable behavior, known unacceptable 
behavior will happen (e.g., PINC) (Huntzinger, 2006).  Education (training) 
to the point of applicability to line operations is the key.  The idea that the 
noncompliant behavior is only a negative when detected is false 
because (1), much of it is detected through FOQA and (2), 
noncompliance with SOP can lead to incidents and accidents, outcomes 
pilots and management are fundamentally against.   In describing a just 
culture, Reason (1998) states that, “All members of an organization should 
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understand where the line must be drawn between unacceptable 
behaviour [SIC], deserving of disciplinary action, and the remainder, 
where punishment is neither appropriate nor helpful in furthering the 
cause of safety” (p. 303).  An informed culture is a safe culture, and when 
both management and pilots are motivated to avoid risks and stay out of 
the newspapers, it seems that information is key.  
 Following the crash in Buffalo, NY, of Continental Connection Flight 
3407, a flight operated by Colgan Air, in February of 2009, the cockpit 
voice recorder (CVR) was reported to have “distracted banter” during 
the period of sterile cockpit required by FAR 121.542 during all non-cruise 
operations below 10,000 feet MSL (Trumbell, 2009).  These and other 
incidents and accidents have led to increased concern for airlines and 
pilots and are grounds for scrutiny by the FAA of pilot-professionalism in 
U.S. airline cockpits.  In an article written for USA Today, FAA Administrator 
Randy Babbitt (2010) comments on the access the FAA has to flight 
information:
 The FAA has more information from airlines, pilots and aircraft 
 recorders than we have  ever had before. These tools enable our 
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 safety inspectors to better analyze data, spot safety trends, and 
 prioritize risks before accidents happen. (p. 10A)
Both airline management and pilot unions have little interest in voluntarily 
giving the FAA access to data that could put them in jeopardy, and, while 
airline safety programs have been developed with protections from 
disciplinary action, all parties involved are skeptical (Logan, 2008).  Pilot 
unions have raised concerns about AQP and LOSA, which rely on 
concepts like “train to proficiency” and the integrity of the process, which 
requires management and pilots to trust each other.  Any lack of trust 
reduces the authenticity of the results.  Simply put: “If an airline fails to 
earn its pilots’ trust, then LOSA will be nothing more than an elaborate line 
check, and the airline will have wasted an opportunity to gain a unique 
perspective of actual practices on the line.” (Klinect et al., 2003, p. 5)
 CVR data is only analyzed when there is reason to collect it 
following an accident or incident, and pilots’ unions do not favor allowing 
more access for the FAA or even airline officials (Wald, 2005), but there is 
plenty of other data available for scrutiny. 
 Programs like ASAP, FOQA, LOSA audits and the FAA’s involvement 
with airline training allow for regulators to understand much of what is 
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happening in U.S. airline cockpits.  In an article describing airlines efforts to 
prevent errors, Logan (2008) made this conclusion: “Airline safety 
programs have evolved from reactive to proactive programs in an 
attempt to improve an already excellent safety record.  Zero accidents 
are the goal that the industry strives for” (p. s181).  These tools are used by 
the FAA and airlines to discover trends and areas where a lack of SOP 
compliance is indicated.
Research Questions
 The purpose of this research is to determine if increased 
understanding, knowledge and awareness of the risk of noncompliance 
with SOP will increase airline pilots’ compliance with SOP.  It has already 
been established that pilots are commonly a very capable group.  As 
their experience grows, their adversity to high-risk may cause them to 
avoid situations where they might find trouble.  Often times their 
intelligence drives them to make the wisest, most prudent choice as they 
strive for safety.  A natural extension to understanding pilot personalities 
might be to assume that they are likely to enjoy the establishment of SOP 
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and are excited to follow it to the letter.  Quite the contrary, pilots are not 
content with the way labor has been treated in “the airline 
industry’s...most volatile period in the past 20 years” (Goodman, 2008, p. 
14).  This frustration could serve as a distraction resulting in attention to 
SOP being diverted (Dismukes et al., 2007). 
 Since September 11, 2001, uncertainty has ruled airline aviation, 
and when it comes to pushing for compliance, pilots have a tendency to 
push back.  A quandary is defined as a state of doubt or uncertainty, 
especially with regard to the choice of alternatives (Quinion, 2008).  In the 
case of PINC, the pilots’ know SOP but choose another procedure, where 
in the case of PUNC the SOP may not be clear or properly understood.  In 
every case pilots’ are tasked to comply, even if they are unsure what a 
specific SOP compliance requires or don’t like the SOP, the more difficult 
charge to the pilot in command.  Perhaps this is why pilots find themselves 
in a quandary regarding SOP compliance – they are conflicted. 
 SOPs are developed by airline management and experienced line 
pilots in the safety and comfort of an office. Safety, trainability and what is 
best for the company are all factors in how SOPs are determined.  Along 
with personal experience and past practice, they consult the 
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manufacturer’s airplane flight crew operating manual and other sources 
to determine what SOP is best. “A single pilot sitting in an airplane going 
450 knots does not have that luxury, so I believe that adherence to SOPs is 
primary to flight safety. No procedure developed on the fly can 
compare.”  (R. Cunningham, personal communication, February 23, 
2011).  New initiatives result in new procedures and it is difficult sometimes 
for pilots to keep track of which procedure is the current procedure, 
especially when the reason for the change to SOP is not explained or 
understood.  Pilots may feel that the SOP prescribed for a given scenario is 
unsafe, complicated, or simply unnecessary.  Pilots are opposed to 
change, especially when the procedure being replaced was, in their 
opinion, was at least as safe, if not more safe than the new SOP (Dismukes 
et al., 2007). 
 Also, because of Captain’s authority, pilots mistakenly believe that 
their certificate entitles them to disregard SOP if they have determined 
that their way is “more safe.”  This is true in the application of 
‘recommended practices’, the term applied to specific techniques 
trained by the airline.  When it comes to recommendations, pilots can 
adopt the recommended technique or develop their own (Aircraft 
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Operating Manual, 2010).   For SOP, except for in an emergency situation 
where an emergency has been declared, failure to comply with SOP is a 
violation of the certificate they hold which requires them to operate 
according to company policies and procedures (FAR/AIM 2011).  
Therefore, pilots may believe that the company prescribed way to 
operate a jet and the absolute safest way to fly are often not equal.
 In a specific airline’s AQP, recurrent training time is often limited 
because the goal is to meet the minimum requirements and keep costs 
low.  According to Rigner and Dekker (2000), today’s airlines are 
sometimes faced with limited training time available, and their chosen 
training approach may not allow instructors to elaborate where need is 
shown because of prescribed tasks that must be accomplished.  In other 
words, there is a lot to cover in a limited amount of time, which often 
results in training deficiencies that may or may not show up in Line 
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) or line checks.  Updates to current 
procedures are distributed to pilots by bulletins, and amended SOP are 
sometimes trained by textual description alone.  Pilots are expected to 
maintain a firm understanding on the execution of current SOP, often 
times without receiving any training on that SOP.  Therefore, the amount of 
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information and training provided with changes to SOP is may not be 
adequate.
 Several authors state that the lack of understanding of the 
implications of disregarding SOP is a factor in a pilot’s decision to violate 
SOP.  Before FOQA programs, airlines were largely unaware of the specific 
configurations their aircraft were operated by a particular pilot on a given 
day.  With FOQA and ASAP, they can link the pilot to flight performance 
data through all phases of flight.  Another factor is the protection of the 
ASAP program, which protects pilots as long as the violation was 
unintentional and not in violation of SOP.  Pilots may not have adequate 
understanding of the consequences of intentional non compliance.   
PINC holds pilots responsible to follow procedures, and except for 
emergency situations, they are expected to follow SOP or face the 
consequences.  The consequences include being violated by the FAA 
because the immunity of the ASAP programs will not extend to 
intentionally risky behavior.  The truth is “they” (the company and FAA) 
know what pilots are doing on every flight and the responsibility to comply 
with SOP is not only present on a line check.  Therefore, pilots may not be 
adequately aware of the risk associated with their decision to disregard 
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SOP.  This is a new change, and once pilots are trained and understand 
the risk associated with noncompliance with SOP, compliance may 
increase. 
 The research questions posed by this study are 
1. Do Microscope Line Check findings differ following instruction on PINC 
and PUNC as compared to pre-instruction findings?  
2. Do the top 12 “non-standard” items on the Microscope Line Check 
improve in rank amongst top 12 items following instruction on PINC and 
PUNC?
3. Do Microscope Line Check findings differ following a corporate 
strategy to improve SOP compliance is put into place? 
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CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
 The purpose of this research is to determine if increased training of 
the risk of noncompliance with SOP will increase airline pilots’ compliance 
with SOP.  To establish a need for further study, LOSA checks were 
accomplished at a major U.S. airline during January of 2010.  As a result of 
the LOSA checks, it was determined that more emphasis and education 
were needed concerning SOP compliance. 
 Microscope Line Checks (MLC) were conducted on 308 flights in 
January and February of 2010.  Check airmen were assigned to observe 
on randomly selected routes to collect the data and complete the 
checks.  These MLC were classified as line checks, not LOSA, and 
therefore if a pilot were to fail the MLC they would be disqualified and 
sent for training in accordance with AQP.   
 After the high frequency MLC in January through February of 2010, 
the airline elected to continue using the same survey on all scheduled line 
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checks required by AQP.   Additional data was collected through March 
2011 and is also used in this research.  All data were recorded 
anonymously and tested against specific changes to airline training and 
policies to determine effect on pilot’s SOP compliance.  Finally, the 
Institutional Review Board at the University of North Dakota reviewed and 
approved the project including the survey questions, proposed sample, 
and research methods. 
The Survey
 The checks utilized a standardized survey of 60 different SOP items.  
The survey items were broken down by phase of flight.  Each phase of 
flight included any checklists to be completed, actions to be taken and 
any other specific SOP actions required.  There was also a section for 
general SOP items, for example “Appearance” or “Point and Shoot used 
for all altitude changes” [See appendix A for specific descriptions of each 
survey item.]  Each item was scored either as “Standard,” “Nonstandard,” 
“Not Applicable” or “Not Observed.”  The check airmen performing the 
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MLC were asked to record comments on each of the “Nonstandard” 
items to establish the reason for the discrepancy. 
 To understand the specifics of each occurrence of noncompliance, 
the researcher recorded and analyzed the comments from each of the 
flights conducted in January and February of 2010.  While this qualitative 
data was not used to determine any trends of noncompliance, it was 
used to determine which specific initiatives and procedural changes 
should be tested for potential effect on SOP compliance.  
Corporate Strategy to Improve SOP Compliance
 Along with the MLC that began in January, 2010, the company 
determined that the LOSA of January 2010 indicated a need to change 
its SOP training and better explain what was expected of pilots.  To kickoff 
the campaign, a poster of a pilot with the banner, “SOP: It’s the only 
choice” was placed in the entrance to the operations area of each of 
the airline’s crew bases [see appendix C].  Specific training on PINC was 
added to the Human Factors training module that was presented to pilots 
during initial, transition, upgrade and recurrent training.   By August 31, 
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2010, all participants had completed this training.  On September 1, 2010, 
specific training designed to address and stimulate discussion of Captain’s 
decision making was added to the Human Factors training module.
Participants 
 Participants are current and qualified flight crews at a major U.S. 
airline.  MLC checks were randomly conducted on flights in both domestic 
and international flight operations during January, February and March.  
Additional MLC data was gathered during the next 12 months during AQP 
required line checks.  With few exceptions, all flight crew members 
(Captains and First Officers) hold a type rating on the aircraft flown.  The 
check airmen who conducted the MLC are also type rated, current and 
qualified captains on the equipment checked. 
Protection of Human Subjects
 Participants remained anonymous except for the generalized 
demographic data queried at the beginning of the survey.  The study 
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author notified and received written permission from the management of 
the respective airline to utilize data collected from the survey.  The 
Institutional Review Board at the University of North Dakota reviewed and 
approved the project including the survey questions, proposed sample, 
and research methods.
Potential Biases
 The one area of concern for bias is the potential for false-positives 
on items found to be “Standard” SOP performance.  The MLC is a testing 
event, and therefore it is impossible to know if the pilots exhibited 
“standard” behavior because they always follow SOP, or if they are 
complying with SOP because they are being watched and face de-
qualification if they fail to comply with SOP.  It is unrealistic to expect that 
pilots will demonstrate the same behaviors they would if the check airman 
were truly an unknown presence.  Therefore, any analysis will be limited to 
application to SOP compliance with a check airman in the cockpit, as it is 
impossible to know if the same compliance will carry over to line 
operations (Helmreich, 2003).
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 Additionally, some of the participants who were checked during 
the random MLC used to establish the baseline for SOP compliance may 
have attended Human Factors training prior to their MLC.  Statistically, 
only 14% of line pilots experienced this training during this period.  Because 
the MLC were conducted as the company initiative was launched, no 
data without this bias existed. The Human Factors training on PINC would 
have biased them towards SOP compliance, so using those numbers as a 
baseline is more conservative than to have purely unbiased numbers.
Data Analysis 
 The data will be analyzed to determine if the effect of specific 
initiatives on SOP compliance is significant.  The baseline data will be 
analyzed to determine the top 12 areas of noncompliance.  That data will  
be ranked and compared with the data collected during the months 
after the PINC training was presented to all pilots to determine what 
effect, if any, the PINC training had on SOP compliance rates.  The data 
groups were compared using chi-square to determine any significant 
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change in compliance levels between the pre-PINC training and post-
PINC training time periods.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
 The data set was divided into two groups, pre-PINC training for the 
data collected in January and February of 2010, and post-PINC training 
for the data collected after September 1, 2010.  The data from the pre-
PINC training flights were ranked based on the number of ‘non-standard’ 
events in each of the 60 areas tested.  The top 12 areas of 
noncompliance from the pre-PINC training group were analyzed in this 
study.
 The first group of data, labeled pre-PINC training, was from the 
period before all subjects experienced the Human Factors module 
containing PINC training.  These data were gathered from 306 randomly 
selected flights.  Of the 60 areas tested in the survey, the top 12 areas of 
non compliance from the January and February 2010 MLC (pre-PINC 
training) were ranked below in Table 1.
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 The second group of data, labeled post-PINC training, was 
collected during flights that were flown after each line pilot at the airline 
had received PINC training during the last 9-months.  These data were 
gathered from 289 flights during which AQP required line checks were 
being accomplished.  Of the 60 areas tested in the survey, the top 12 
areas of noncompliance from the September 2010 through March 2011 
MLC (post-PINC training) were ranked in Table 1 (numbers in parenthesis 
indicate survey question number):
Table 1. Top 12 non standard items ranking.
Non-standard Item
Pre-PINC 
Training 
Rank
(n = 306)
Post-PINC 
Training 
Rank
(n = 289)
Climb speed policy compliance (29) 1 1
Standardized descent speed compliance (44) 2 6
Appearance (63) 3 12
“Point and Shoot” for all altitude changes (65) 4 7
Before Takeoff checklist (26) 5 3
Before Taxi/Taxi checklist (18) 6 8
Takeoff briefing accomplished (13) 7 10
(G)FMS route/legs verification check (12) 8 (tie) 4
After-Landing - Taxi checklist (57) 8 (tie) 11
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Table 1. Top 12 non standard items ranking cont.
Non-standard Item
Pre-PINC 
Training 
Rank
(n = 306)
Post-PINC 
Training 
Rank
(n = 289)
Parking checklist (61) 10 9
Before Starting Engines checklist (16) 11 2
Cruise Checklist (31) 12 5
Note: The post-PINC training rankings do not represent the top-12 of all 60 
non-standard areas in the post-PINC training group, but a re-ranking of 
the top-12 from the pre-PINC training group.  The same 60 areas were 
tested for SOP compliance on all flights.
Statistical Analysis
 The data groups were compared using chi-square to determine any 
significant change in compliance levels between the pre-PINC training 
and post-PINC training time periods. 
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Table 2.  Non-standard results.
Non-standard Item
Pre-PINC 
Training 
Observed/
expected
Post-PINC 
Training
Observed/
Expected Sig.
Climb speed policy (29) 48/38.8 27/36.2 0.023
Standardized descent speed (44) 28/20.4 12/19.6 0.012
Appearance (63) 22/11.2 0/10.8 0.000
“Point and Shoot” (65) 21/15.7 10/15.3 0.051
Before Takeoff checklist (26) 20/19.0 17/18.0 0.741
Before Taxi/Taxi checklist (18) 18/12.9 7/12.1 0.036
Takeoff briefing (13) 16/10.8 5/10.2 0.022
(G)FMS route/legs check (12) 15/15.3 15/14.7 0.901
After-Landing - Taxi checklist (57) 15/9.3 3/8.7 0.006
Parking checklist (61) 14/10.3 6/9.7 0.088
Before Starting Engines checklist (16) 13/15.9 18/15.1 0.277
Cruise Checklist (31) 12/12.9 13/12.1 0.717
Data Summary
 Of the top 12 noncompliant areas analyzed for relationship, six of 
the 12 showed increased compliance with the specific area of SOP.   The 
greatest difference between the pre-PINC training and post-PINC training 
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groups was in non-standard appearance.  Non-standard “Point and 
Shoot” used for all altitude changes, was not statistically significant, but 
with p = .051, this item approached finding a significant difference 
between pre-PINC and post-PINC groups.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
 The data show that in six of 12 specific areas studied, pilots who 
have been exposed to training on PINC will perform SOP in a manner that 
the company will grade “standard” on line checks.  In all areas (n=12) 
except three, there was an overall improvement in SOP compliance.  In 
two the three cases where the SOP compliance did not improve, the item 
tested was a checklist with multiple items, and therefore multiple places 
where the non-standard behavior could have been displayed.  Further 
research into the qualitative section of the MLC form would be useful to 
determine the cause of the “non-standard” grading.
 Checklist items accounted for two of the six areas with significant 
improvement.  In both the Before Taxi/Taxi Checklist and the After Landing 
-Taxi Checklist, pilots who experienced training on PINC were found to 
perform better than pilots who had not received PINC training:
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Table 3.  Before Taxi/Taxi Checklist
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 18/12.9 7/12.1 25
Standard Observed/Expected 286/291.1 280/274.9 566
χ2 (1, N = 591) = 4.418, p < .05.
Table 4.  After Landing - Taxi Checklist
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 15/3 3/8.7 18
Standard Observed/Expected 288/293.7 280/274.3 568
χ2 (1, N = 586) = 7.439, p < .05.
The researcher finds this noteworthy because in the Before Taxi/Taxi 
Checklist and After Landing – Taxi Checklist there are 11 (approximately – 
depending on fleet type) items on the checklist, and therefore 11 places 
to find oneself graded “non-standard” by a check airmen.  The specific 
checklist items with noted improvement each consist of over 10 individual 
checks which could each result in noncompliance.  Additionally, the 
Before Taxi/Taxi checklist was introduced in 2009 in order to achieve fleet 
standardization.  Before that time, fleets only had Taxi checklists.  The 
improvement in compliance could be attributed to pilots becoming more 
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familiar with the new procedures as they visited the simulator and 
received training by the check airmen on the new change, something 
that occurred during the same training cycle they received their PINC 
human factors training.
 Non-standard descent speed compliance was number two in the 
pre-PINC training “non-standard” rankings, and showed improvement to 
number six in the post-PINC training rankings.  
Table 5.  Non-standard Standardized Descent Speed Compliance
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 28/20.4 12/19.6 40
Standard Observed/Expected 266/273.6 271/263.4 537
χ2 (1, N = 577) = 6.239, p < .05.
 The reason for this is twofold: first, “minimum descent speed – 
checked” is an item on the first section of the Cruise Checklist.  It is a 
simple entry (cruise mach/aircraft specific descent speed) called for at a 
quiet part of the flight (level off), and the checklist cannot be called 
“complete” until it is entered.  Second, PINC training specifically 
addressed checklist completion.  It is interesting to note that the number 
12 “non-standard” item in the pre-PINC training rankings was the Cruise 
Checklist, which showed no improvement in SOP compliance in post-PINC 
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training group, and it actually had one more occurrence of 
noncompliance in a smaller number of total flights in the post-PINC 
training group.  
Table 6.  Non-standard Cruise Checklist
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 12/12.9 13/12.1 25
Standard Observed/Expected 289/288.1 270/270.9 559
χ2 (1, N = 584) = 0.131, p > .05.
 In terms of ranking, the Cruise Checklist had the second worst 
‘decline’ in ranking between the pre-PINC training ranking and the post-
PINC training ranking, rising from 12th worst area of non-compliance to 5th.  
“Minimum Descent Speed – Checked” is on the Cruise Checklist.  Further 
research into the comments on “non-standard” grades on non-standard 
Cruise Checklist, is required to understand the reason for the “non-
standard” marks. 
 Non-standard climb speed policy compliance showed significant 
improvement from the pre-PINC training group to the post-PINC training 
group, yet it still remained the number one area of noncompliance in the 
post-PINC training group.  
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Table 7.  Non-standard Climb Speed Policy Compliance
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 48/38.8 27/36.2 75
Standard Observed/Expected 255/264.2 256/246.8 511
χ2(1, N = 586) = 5.205, p < .05.
 
The airline introduced the climb speed policy in 2009 in the interest of 
minimizing fuel burn and standardizing fleets.  Unlike non-standard 
descent speed, “climb speed” is not an item on any checklist.  It is 
supposed to be entered into the flight management computer during the 
preflight, and it is covered under the umbrella of the “CDU – Checked” 
response on the Before Starting Engines Checklist.  Before the policy was 
introduced, pilots used a variety of recommended practices to program 
their climb speeds (i.e., flight plan climb speed, transitioning to cruise 
mach number), but there was no existing SOP for the entry of a climb 
speed.  The new climb speed policy was distributed by pink bulletin as an 
amendment to the Aircraft Operating Manual, and at first a reminder was 
printed out in the appended messages portion of every flight plan.  This 
“reminder” was removed at some point after the pre-PINC training group 
MLCs took place.  The Standard Climb Speeds are currently located in the 
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aircraft operating manual in the Climb – Cruise – Descent section, 
something not normally accessed during normal preflight procedures.  
 Non-standard takeoff briefing accomplished was unique as it was 
the only item in the top-12 non-standard ranking with an expanded 
definition of which SOP items check airmen should be looking for.  The 
description lists “Taxi Route, Hot Spots, SID, FM II special procedures, 
engine out, terrain considerations (MEA, MSA, Grid MORA), Transition 
Altitude, takeoff.”  There results showed that pilots who had received PINC 
training were more compliant with SOP than the pre-PINC training pilots, p 
= .022.  
Table 8.  Non-standard Takeoff Briefing
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 16/10.8 5/10.2 21
Standard Observed/Expected 287/292.2 279/273.8 566
χ2 (1, N = 587) = 5.266, p < .05.
This validates the researchers belief that PINC training will increase SOP 
compliance, but in the pursuit of understanding the SOP for a takeoff 
briefing the researcher found no place in the Aircraft Operating Manuals 
or in the Flight Operations Manual where all these requirements are listed 
as SOP.  
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 In fact, this it all that is included about takeoff briefings in the 
Aircraft Operating Manual [items in bold in original document for 
emphasis]:
The takeoff briefing consists of (as a minimum):
 Designate the pilot-flying
 Rejected takeoff considerations
 Any other contingencies (if applicable).
The briefing is completed at the gate, to the extent possible, 
to allow both pilots to focus on taxi operations after gate 
departure. Last minute clearance changes from ATC (taxi or 
departure) will be verbalized by the F/O and verified by the 
Captain. Checklist items covering the departure procedure 
need not be briefed unless some contingency or exception 
exists. When required, the Captain will conduct whatever 
briefing is appropriate to the situation (e.g., poor weather, 
inexperienced crew member, etc.). The Captain, at his / her 
discretion, may delegate the briefing to the F/O (Pilot-Flying), 
with the understanding the Captain will take the aircraft in 
the event of an RTO in compliance with current policy.”
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Followed by this:
“The takeoff briefing will be conducted by the Captain (or at 
the Captain’s discretion, the Pilot-Flying) at the gate and 
include, as a minimum:
 Designate the pilot-flying
 Rejected takeoff considerations.
Contingencies, if appropriate:
 Departure procedure (required only if not covered 
previously by checklist completion or if revised by 
ATC)
 Airport specific engine failure profile
 Takeoff alternate
 Takeoff weather considerations
 Runway surface conditions
 Terrain considerations
 Any other variables associated with the taxi and 
takeoff. (Aircraft Operating Manual, 2010)
 Of those listed on the MLC form, standard instrument departure (SID), 
engine out, terrain and takeoff are the only ones that the researcher 
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could find in the governing books of the airlines SOP.  It would be 
expected that a pilot could decide that in order to effectively brief terrain 
considerations, the minimum safe altitude (MSA) should be briefed, or that  
it is wise to brief the planned taxi route, but that would be considered 
recommended technique, not SOP.  
 The term “Hot Spots” is not found in any of the manuals, nor is there 
any requirement to brief the taxi route.  International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) defines a hot spot as a location on an airport 
movement area that has historically been at high risk for collisions or 
runway incursions (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011).  These areas are 
highlighted on airport charts to increase awareness for pilots and drivers. 
The qualitative comments from the pre-PINC training group explain why 
the “non-standard” mark was given included, “Captain did not brief ‘hot 
spots’ along planned taxi routing” and “No taxi route brief.”  It seems 
there might be some confusion in the training department as to what the 
official SOP is for the takeoff briefing.  This exemplifies the need for simple, 
clear, concise and prescriptive SOP so that everyone, pilots and airline 
training departments, understands what is expected. (Aviation Glossary, 
2010)
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 The largest improvement in SOP compliance was found in non-
standard appearance.
Table 9.  Non-standard Appearance
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 22/11.2 0/10.8 22
Standard Observed/Expected 272/282.2 285/274.2 557
χ2 (1, N = 579) = 22.169, p < .05. 
This standardized residual far exceeded 1.96 (z = 3.2) and the actual p < .
001.  While it is possible to draw the conclusion that PINC training had an 
incredible effect on pilots appearance, it is interesting to also note that 
the flight department at this particular airline distributed a letter to all pilots 
signed by a majority of the chief pilots indicating that the culture of 
uniform compliance is changing.  Another possible contributing factor 
was a change in leadership that was accompanied by a less-restrictive 
hat and tie policy “rumor”.  That rumor became official in a recent revision 
to the carriers flight operations manual.  Analysis of the pre-PINC training 
data comments to understand how many of them were hat and tie 
related might reveal fewer non-standard appearance scores if the current  
policy were applied to pre-PINC training data.  Regardless, the airline can 
be satisfied to know that they met the seemingly unachievable goal of 
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perfect compliance with SOP in this one area in the post-PINC training line 
checks. 
 Although not significant, non-standard “Point and Shoot” used for all 
altitude changes did recognize improvements between the pre- and 
post-PINC training groups.  The difference between post-PINC training 
pilots approached significant improvement over the pre-PINC training 
group, p = .051.  
Table 10.  Non-standard “Point and Shoot” used for All Altitude Changes
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 21/15.7 10/15.3 31
Standard Observed/Expected 270/275.3 273/267.7 543
χ2 (1, N = 574) = 3.809, p > .05.
While the airline had a coincidental policy of limiting SOP changes during 
the period of the data collection, this particular item did have a change 
effective April 8, 2010.  This change modified the “Point and Shoot” that 
required the PM to change the altitude, point at the window, state the 
altitude and wait for the PF to verbally acknowledge and point, or “shoot” 
at the altitude window.  The new policy got rid of the need for the PF to 
“shoot” the window and now required only a verbal acknowledgement of 
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the newly assigned altitude.   In the pre-PINC training group there were 21 
non-standard marks from 291 flights, and only 10 non-standard marks out 
of the 283 post-PINC training flights.  While the findings were not 
significant, it is possible that the simplification of procedures could have 
had an impact on the top-12 rankings, moving from 4th least compliant 
item in the pre-PINC training to 7th in the post-PINC training group.
 Of the remaining items to be discussed, three of them are checklists 
that showed no significant difference between the pre-PINC training and 
post-PINC training data.  In fact, the non-standard marks on the Before 
Starting Engines, Before Takeoff and Parking Checklists all had worse 
rankings on the post-PINC training top-12 than on the pre-PINC training 
top-12.  
Table 11.  Non-standard Before Starting Engine Checklist
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 13/15.9 18/15.1 31
Standard Observed/Expected 291/288.1 269/271.9 560
χ2 (1, N = 591) = 1.183, p > .05.
The Before Starting Engines Checklist compliance item was ranked 11th 
worst pre-PINC training to 2nd worst post-PINC training, the greatest 
increase in rank of all items.  The researcher believes that due to the large 
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number of items on a checklist, it is easy to find something non-standard 
which would deem the entire checklist non-standard.  On one fleet, the 
Parking Checklist’s non-standard comments involved six different checklist 
items, three of which were only marked non-standard on a single flight.  
Table 12.  Non-standard Parking Checklist
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 14/10.3 6/9.7 20
Standard Observed/Expected 287/290.7 280/276.3 567
χ2 (1, N = 587) = 2.905, p >.05.
It is important to study further the source of these non-standard marks and 
determine which areas can be focused on to improve pilot’s 
understanding of SOP on normal checklists.   
 The final item for discussion is item 12, non-standard (G)FMS route/
legs verification check. Regarding item 12, the SOP for this is not new. 
Table 13.  Non-standard (G)FMS Route/Legs Verification Check
PINC Status
Pre-PINC 
Training
Post-PINC 
Training Total
Non-Standard Observed/Expected 15/15.3 15/14.7 30
Standard Observed/Expected 286/285.7 273/273.3 559
χ2 (1, N = 589) = 0.015, p > .05.
 This item’s ranking moved from 8th least compliant area to 4th least 
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compliant, the third worst decline in rank.  The researcher found the SOP 
for this item to be fairly consistent in all fleets, with variations in the types of 
(G)FMS the only reason for between-fleet differences.  The interesting 
finding about this data was that of the 30 flights found non-standard, 25 of 
them (83.33%) were flown on domestic routes.  
 A possible explanation for this finding is that international routes are 
complex and often flown over areas without reliable ground based 
navigational aids or radar coverage, the flight plan is checked against 
the (G)FMS for accuracy many times.  Domestic flights are almost always 
in radar coverage, routes are familiar, and while the chance for violation 
is just as prevalent as it is on international routes, the fear of a gross 
navigational error fine simply doesn’t exist.  This theory could be 
researched further to understand if there is a significant difference in 
(G)FMS route/legs check compliance between domestic and 
international flights and, if so, explore the check airmen’s comments to 
further understand potential solutions to increase domestic pilots 
awareness of how to comply and the risk of noncompliance.
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Recommendations
 Due to the significant findings of improvement in the post-PINC 
training group in six of the 12 areas tested, this researcher feels that PINC 
training should continue to be a part of human factors training.  
Additionally, the airline should continue to look for new ways to increase 
pilot’s understanding of the consequences of choosing to disregard SOP.  
As of September 1, 2010, Captain’s decision making training was added 
to the PINC training.  However, in order to increase the safety culture the 
airline should provide assertiveness training to the First Officers.  This 
training should involve both Captains and First Officers with the goal of 
establishing roles and expectations.   First Officers must respect the role of 
the Captain while helping the Captain comply with SOP, and alerting the 
Captain to any deviation from SOP is part of that.  This training has the 
potential to bring the CRM aspect of SOP full circle and this step is vitally 
necessary in pursuit of a more SOP compliant operation and improvement 
in the overall safety culture of the airline.
 To simplify SOP compliance, a Quick Reference Card specific to 
each fleet should be developed.  In the case of Climb Speed 
compliance, the card would serve to make complicated Climb Speed 
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tables easily available for pilots to crosscheck every flight.  This card could 
be used as a tool to help pilots comply with all items required on the 
Takeoff briefing.  This tool should also include similar lists for Crew Change 
briefings for 3- or 4-pilot crews and for the Approach briefing called for on 
the Descent Checklist. Aircraft limitations as well as other 
recommendations from line pilots could be added as well.   
 Research into the causes of non-standard procedure compliance in 
the MLC comments section could reveal additional items to include on 
the Quick Reference Card.  The card should be administered not as a 
recommended tool, but as SOP for all crewmembers to reference the 
card, at least in the case of multiple item briefings.  
 Because six of the top-12 areas of noncompliance were checklist 
related, there are two recommendations to help improve in checklist SOP.  
First, there were a number of “no ‘checklist complete’ call out” and 
“incorrect response to a couple of items” qualitative remarks on all the 
checklists that made the top-12.  Checklist discipline is something that 
some pilots make a daily practice of, while others make sure they brush-
up on it for whenever they need to go to training.  If the pilots are 
encouraged in training to make line operations checklist discipline just as 
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stringent as it is in training, the culture could shift quickly to be more SOP 
compliant.  First Officers should feel compelled to correct their Captains if 
they say, “Set” when they should say, “Checked,” for example, and 
Captains should correct First Officers on incorrect responses to challenge 
and response items when they are the pilot monitoring (PM).  The 
responsibility for good checklist discipline falls on both Captains and First 
Officers, and the one holding the card and reading the checklist has all 
the answers in their hand.
 The Cruise Checklist was one of the least affected items between the 
pre-PINC training and post-PINC training groups, and its ranking went from 
12th-worst to 5th-worst between groups.  This checklist covers the portion of 
the flight from “top-of-climb” through “Just Prior to Top-of-Descent,” which 
might be 30-minutes on a domestic leg, but can easily exceed 12 hours 
on international flights.  This means that the checklist is in progress and 
awaiting completion for the majority of many flights.  The researcher 
recommends consideration of establishing two or three separate 
checklists for the cruise portion of flight as this may make it more 
reasonable to expect pilots to remember to comply with all SOP even on 
the longest of flights.  Other modifications recommended are to add 
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“Climb Speed – set” to the Before Starting Engines Checklist and “Seat Belt  
Sign - ON” to the Just Prior to Top-of-Descent portion of the Cruise 
Checklist. 
 One of the most common areas of noncompliance on the After 
Landing – Taxi Checklist was not an actual line item on the checklist, but 
an arrival procedure.  First Officers are required to make an arrival PA 
immediately after gate arrival.  There were many cases of First Officers 
making the announcement approaching the gate, which does not 
comply with SOP.  Additionally, the Captains immediate action item upon 
gate arrival is to set the parking brake and turn off the seat belt sign.  
 According to SOP, these actions must be performed immediately 
upon gate arrival, which leaves the First Officer announcing, "Ladies and 
gentlemen, please remain seated until the Captain has turned off the 
seat belt sign. Flight Attendants prepare for arrival and cross check," two 
to three-seconds after the Captain has turned off the sign.  If the First 
Officer makes the PA early or the Captain delays the immediate action of 
turning off the sign, they are not complying with SOP.  The first portion of 
the PA is to prevent passengers from unbuckling and getting hurt in the 
last few precious feet of their flight, and the second portion is to let flight 
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attendants know that the brake is parked, aircraft is at the gate, and it is 
safe to disarm their doors.  
 The SOP should be modified so that the "Ladies and gentlemen, 
please remain seated until the Captain has turned off the seat belt sign,” 
portion of the PA is announced once the parking area has been cleared 
and the aircraft will immediately proceed to the gate.  Once the parking 
brake is set at the gate, the First Officer can announce, “Flight Attendants 
prepare for arrival and cross check."  This modification allows for the 
reminder to remain seated with seat belts fastened to precede the 
seatbelt sign being turned off, the flight attendants to disarm the doors 
only after aircraft arrival, and would bring SOP in line with the intention to 
keep passengers and flight attendants safe.
 One of the biggest challenges for many U.S. major airlines is that they 
essentially operate two different airlines, one domestic and one 
international.  They have short-haul and long-haul flights and a variety of 
fleets enlisted to accomplish the goal of safely moving people.  In the 
goal of standardization, these differences cannot be ignored.  Non-
standard (G)FMS route/legs verification check, brought to light a 
difference between compliance rates domestic and international flights.  
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If it is the airlines plan to standardize fleets in this operating area, it is 
important that this procedure is highlighted and the reason behind 
checking the paper flight plan with the electronic flight plan is brought to 
light.  Pilots are frustrated when they are asked to do something because 
it is SOP, especially when it seems to be excessively redundant for routes 
they routinely fly.  There are many reasons why this route/legs check is 
important, and the application of this procedure to domestic flights 
makes sense because there is a potential for mistakes if the procedure is 
not conducted properly.  The skies are getting more populated, and ATC 
separation requirements are shrinking.  Educating pilots on the “how?” 
and “why?” of a procedure that they may have deemed unnecessary 
could shift their thinking.  
 The final recommendation of the researcher is in all development of 
training and new SOPs, differences between fleets and pilot’s aversion to 
change must be acknowledged and addressed to effectively increase 
SOP compliance.
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Future Research
 The question as to whether increased understanding, knowledge 
and awareness of individual airline SOP and the risk of noncompliance 
with SOP increase airline pilot’s compliance with SOP has been only 
partially explored by the research project, and further research is required 
to more fully answer the question.  It was the original intention of the 
researcher to measure the effect of specific training on the 757/767 fleet’s 
SOP compliance rates, but due to time constraints there was not enough 
data to complete that specific portion of the research.  That training will 
be distributed to the pilots on the 757/767 and the data should be 
available for analysis in July 2011.  That training is specifically focused on 
the top-10 areas of noncompliance on the 757/767 fleet and the 
information to be distributed can be found in appendix C.
 Because the data was collected on multiple fleets in both domestic 
and international operations on long-haul and short-haul flights, further 
investigation comparing data in these groups could lead to better 
understanding of specific areas where SOP compliance rates may differ.  
This research could serve to better explain the conditions under which 
greater rates of noncompliance exist in certain operations, thereby 
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allowing training to be designed to directly address the problem area.  
This would help to avoid blanket solutions that, applied company wide, 
are often rejected by the groups not exhibiting the noncompliant 
behavior.  This data is already available for further analysis, and this 
prescriptive application of new SOP to problem areas has the potential to 
be well received by pilots who understand why SOP is being changed 
and how to use the new SOP.  Additionally, the airline should consider a 
study of their current checklist procedures to determine if there is any 
room for improvement or change.
 It is also recommended that the airline to use future data to 
understand the effect of non-training events on SOP compliance.  The 
PINC training that pilots received that was tested for this research project 
was an example of an external motivator for compliance.  If pilots don’t 
comply with SOP, they risk being violated.  This external motivator, while 
shown by this study to be effective, is defined as a negative motivator.  
The U.S. Navy publishes this about the use of negative motivation on 
subordinates:
Fear activates such negative incentives as threat of punishment or 
restriction of personal needs.  Negative motivation, however, often 
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destroys morale; and effectiveness will decline as morale declines. 
Long-term or frequent use of negative motivation is self-defeating. 
(U.S. Navy, 2010, p. 4-17)
 Future research into the effects of positive external motivators like 
improved working conditions due to settled union labor disputes, positive 
corporate financial reports, and the announcement of growth with new 
airplanes, route, or hiring of new pilots should be conducted.  This 
research could reveal if improved morale and the possible effect of a less 
distracted cockpit environment could lead to an increase in SOP 
compliance.  Additional research could answer if the removal of financial 
pressures on pilots increase SOP compliance.  Data gathered during times 
of expansion could compare new Captains to Captains who have been 
in the left seat for five years or more to determine who is more SOP 
compliant.   These and many other questions could be analyzed to better 
understand what motivates pilots to comply with SOP. 
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Conclusion
 Due human error, it is not possible for airlines to ever achieve 100% 
compliance with SOP, no matter how much training, clarification and 
understanding pilots have of existing SOP.  Pilots will make mistakes, but 
the determination to pursue perfect SOP compliance should be a part of 
a pilot’s commitment to professionalism just as primum nil nocere, “first, do 
no harm,” is a fundamental part of physician’s ethics training in medical 
school.  It is an attitude of excellence, a foundation that serves to underlie 
the best, most safe operation every time they are charged with the 
command of an aircraft full of trusting passengers.  
 The amount of man-machine interaction required in the operation 
of highly automated aircraft flown by airlines today is negligible when 
compared to the virtually non-automated 707 or even the 727.  This has 
reduced the need for pilots to ‘do’ and increased the need for pilots to 
‘monitor’.  Bhana (2010) states, “The paradigm shift is significant, as it 
requires a different pilot skill set to be added to the traditional ‘stick and 
rudder’ skills.” (p. 14).  Couple this threat of complacency with FOQA and 
the threat of PINC and PUNC, and it is vividly apparent that today’s airline 
pilots are operating in a different world in 2011 than they were even 5 
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years ago, and it is drastically different from the environment 15 to 35 
years ago when most of today’s U.S. major airline pilots learned to fly.  
Acknowledgement of that change requires understanding of the 
implications that accompany FOQA, PINC, PUNC and automation, 
bringing to light the fundamental need for SOP compliance.  
 Aristotle once said, “Excellence is an art won by training and 
habituation. We do not act rightly because we have virtue or excellence, 
but we rather have those because we have acted rightly. We are what 
we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit (n.d.)”  John 
Hale, the Vice President of Flight at American Airlines has been credited 
with coining the phrase ‘aggressively safe.’  In his introduction to the Flight 
Operations Manual he states, “We just do not have the luxury of being 
anything but excellent every single time we climb into the cockpit” (Hale, 
2011).  Aggressively safe is an attitude he asks his pilots to adopt every 
time they fly, a proactive approach to flying in pursuit of preparation for 
the unknown threats that absolutely exist.  He believes that, like in 
defensive driving, we must pursue safety throughout all phases of flight 
because the threat of complacency is real.   SOP compliance is the 
foundation to aggressively safe operations.  
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 If airlines can provide pilots with SOP that are simple, clear, concise 
and prescriptive and provide pilots with the training to understand the 
reason for SOP and how to successfully apply it and tools to make 
compliance easy, they will have done their part.  This research established 
that training on the “because I said so” that is the risk of PINC did increase 
SOP compliance.  While SOP compliance is the goal, if pilots receive 
training, clarification and achieve understanding of the ‘why?’ and 
‘how?’ of SOP, they will be far more motivated to do the right thing.  
“Because I said so,” works, but “because it is the right thing to do,” 
changes the motivation from fear to one where the satisfaction of 
complying with SOP because they understand and can justify it as the 
right thing to do positively motivates pilots and engages them as 
professionals to be an important contributor to the airline’s safety culture. 
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Microscope Line Checks Non-standard Item Legend
6)Non-standard Pilot license and Medical Certificate checked 
7)Non-standard Fuel planning coordination with dispatch
8)Non-standard Preflight and Walk Around inspections complete
9)Non-standard F/A briefing accomplished: Turbulence, security, 
enroute delays, cabin/galley E6 logbook write-ups, Gen Decs/
Customs forms.  If routed over 66N over Greenland did Captain 
request F/A review of 66N Supplemental O2 unit?
10)Non-standard Cold Weather Operations - Deice/Anti-Ice 
procedures compliance
11)Non-standard check (G)FMS against flight plan and clearance
12)Non-standard (G)FMS route/legs verification check 
13)Non-standard Takeoff briefing accomplished: Taxi Route, Hot Spots, 
SID, FM II special procedures, engine out, terrain considerations 
(MEA,MSA,Grid MORA), Transition Altitude, takeoff
14)Non-standard Captain manages workload during re-flight phase to 
assure logbook review and flight plan crosscheck concerning MEL/
CDL items thorough and complete
15)Non-standard ETOPS 1 or 2 sign-off check
16)Non-standard Before Starting Engines checklist
17)Non standard Starting Engines Procedure compliance
18)Non standard Before Taxi/Taxi checklist 
19)Non-standard Proper clearing of the area before taxi
20)Non-standard no head down procedures performed while in the 
ramp area during taxi  
21)Non-standard Airport Diagram in use by all pilots 
22)Non-standard Captain's attention primarily focused on taxi 
23)Non-standard Captain and F/O review of takeoff data
24)Non-standard Single Engine Taxi procedures
25)Non-standard communications using standard/ICAO phraseology 
26)Non-standard Before Takeoff checklist
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27)Non-standard Terrain/Obstacle awareness on departure 
28)Non-standard crew comply with airspeed/altitude restrictions and 
navigation parameters on SID 
29)Non-standard climb speed policy compliance 
30)Non-standard After Takeoff - Climb checklist
31)Non-standard Cruise Checklist 
32)Non-standard Oceanic Clearance procedure compliance 
33)Non-standard Crew properly maintained AIREP form 
34)Non-standard Circle and Tick procedure compliance 
35)Non-standard Required ATC position reports and plotting 
compliance
36)Non-standard ATC communications compliance (including FIR 
crossing requirements)
37)Non-standard briefing on crew change, who is PIC, alternates, 
weather, etc. 
38)Non-standard communication compliance: HF SELCAL check, 
company position reports, etc. 
39)Non-standard SLOP in North Atlantic/North Pacific 
40)Non-standard MTCP procedures 
41)Non-standard Fuel Saving procedures 
42)Non-standard Cold Fuel procedures 
43)Non-standard Descent Checklist 
44)Non-standard Standardized descent speed compliance 
45)Non-standard approach briefing accomplished (timing, content, 
accuracy, terrain considerations - MEA, MSA, Grid MORA - transition 
altitude) 
46)Non-standard STAR navigation, speed and altitude compliance in 
terminal area 
47)Non-standard Before Landing checklist 
48)Non-standard Contaminated Runway Operations and Landing 
Performance Check 
51)Non-standard Landing Configuration - gear and flaps by 1000' AFL 
52)Non-standard Stabilized approach by 1000' IMC, 500' VMC 
53)Non-standard On visual approach, used all available nav-aids 
54)Non-standard Touchdown point (centerline, touchdown zone)
55)Non-standard Crew Executed a go-around 
56)Non-standard Communications using standard/ICAO phraseology 
57)Non-standard After-Landing - Taxi checklist 
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58)Non-standard Airport Diagram out and referenced by all pilots 
59)Non-standard Single Engine Taxi procedures 
60)Non standard crew ensures equipment clearance is adequate 
during gate arrival 
61)Non-standard Parking checklist
62)Non-standard APU procedures with External Power connected 
63)Non-standard Appearance 
64)Non-standard Sterile cockpit procedures compliance 
65)Non-standard “Point and Shoot” used for all altitude changes 
66)Non-standard Read back of all clearances per Flight Manual Part 1 
67)Non-standard Cockpit door security 
68)Non-standard communication with F/As when approaching/
entering turbulence procedures
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APPENDIX B
Survey
! Microscope!Observation!Form! Boardmail!to:!
! ! Captain!Bart!Roberts!
! ! MD!843!GSWFA!
!
!"#!"!$% &'()%!%
!
Flight Information 
   Enter the following information concerning the flight: 
1. Fleet Type 
     !  B777   !  B767   !  B757   !  B737   !  MD80    
 
2.  Flight Date                                                               Flight No. 
 
                                                           
 
3. Check Airman (Name and Employee #) 
 
                                                           
 
4. Captain’s Crew Base 
     !  DFW   !  LAX   !  LGA   !  MIA   !  ORD   !  SFO   !  DCA   !   STL   !  BOS  
 
5. Departure Station                         Destination Station                    Diversion Station 
 
                                                           
 
 
 
Pre-Departure 
6. Pilot License (English Proficient) and Medical Certificate checked 
     !  Standard     !  Non-Standard     !  Not Applicable     !  Not Observed 
 
7. Fuel planning coordination with dispatch  
     !  Standard     !  Non-Standard     !  Not Applicable     !  Not Observed 
 
      
8. Preflight and Walk Around Inspections completed 
     !  Standard     !  Non-Standard     !  Not Applicable     !  Not Observed 
 
9. F/A briefing accomplished: Turbulence, security, enroute delays, cabin/galley E6 
logbook write-ups, Gen Decs/Customs forms. If routed north of 66N over Greenland did Captain 
request F/A review of 66N Supplemental O2 unit?  
     !  Standard     !  Non-Standard     !  Not Applicable     !  Not Observed 
      
10. Cold Weather Operations – Deice/Anti-Ice Procedures compliance 
     !  Standard     !  Non-Standard     !  Not Applicable     !  Not Observed 
      
11. Check (G)FMS against flight plan and clearance 
     !  Standard     !  Non-Standard     !  Not Applicable     !  Not Observed 
      
12. (G)FMS Route/Legs Verification Check  
     !  Standard     !  Non-Standard     !  Not Applicable     !  Not Observed 
      
Captain ADD fuel?  Quantity and reason why?
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APPENDIX C
Corporate Strategy Poster
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APPENDIX D
Briefing Bulletin for Future Research
Greeting 767 Crews!  My name is Carrie Giles and I am completing my Masters in Aviation at the 
University of North Dakota, and that is the reason for this bulletin.  I am in hot pursuit of better 
ways to educate and train pilots in the realm of Standard Operating Procedures, better known as 
SOP.  In light of the current environment it is easy to understand that SOP compliance might not 
be the most prominent thing on your radar, so I appreciate you taking the time to read this.  
Compliance with SOP is something that Captains are tasked with each time they sign the flight 
plan, and First officers are responsible to speak up whenever SOP are not being followed.  When 
it comes to flight, day in and day out, your certificates and operating manuals require that you 
follow SOP to the letter.  This might sound easy, but SOP seem to change all the time, and one 
must pay close attention to stay up-to-date on current SOP.  So, professional pilot, do you know 
757/767 SOP?  
In February and March of 2010 Microscope Line Checks (MLC) were accomplished to determine 
the level of SOP compliance on all fleets.  Crews were marked either ʻStandardʼ or ʻNon-
Standardʼ in 60 different areas.  The data gathered from those checks was analyzed to determine 
the top 10 deficient areas for the 757/767 fleet.  Examples of non-standard marks from those 
MLC will be given for the top 10 areas in order to highlight the discrepancies and explain what AA 
SOP are.  Chances are you are on top of most of these, but in case you missed a change or 
simply forgot something since your last training, this information is provided to help you. My hope 
is that this information will help to increase your understanding of SOP so that you and your crew 
are 100% compliant the next time a check-airmen shows up on your jet-bridge.
NOTE:  Non-standard operating procedures were noted in a variety of areas 
indicated in bold.  These are the highlights – for more please refer to 767 
training page on AA Pilots.
#1 - NON-STANDARD CLIMB SPEED POLICY COMPLIANCE - 45 OCCURRENCES
 Examples from MLC comments: 
  “Didn’t program CLB speeds in FMS.” 
“The initial climb speed/Alt. was not entered on CDU climb page. V-NAV 
used after takeoff.” “Climbed with full power vs. CLM 2, then CLM 1.  
Used ECON SPD (330/.82) to CLM with (instead of 300/.80).” 
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“Standard speed climb profile not entered into FMC until discovered by 
Captain climbing through FL180.” 
“Debriefed CA & FO on selecting flaps to 5 degrees on a 15 degree flap 
T.O. prior to the standard 3000’ AGL flap retraction altitude for standard 
ICAO noise abatement procedure in Europe.” 
“Out of 10K used ECON CLB. speed of 345 kts. to climb.  Flying VNAV 
SPD in CLB to CRZ ALT, FL 330.  Full CLB speed reselected out of 
16,000’ (climb rate was down at 1500’/min due to extremely high IAS of 
345 kts.)” “Captain used approx. 280 KIAS during climb.  Asked what 
normal 757 climb speed was - he said about 280-290 KIAS.  I said 
normal = 300 KIAS, Turbulent air penetration = 290 KIAS.”
 On Pre-flight checklist:
oCLIMB SPEEDS...EDIT:  Enter climb speed on the FMC CLB page SEL SPD at 
2L.
 On After Takeoff - Climb Checklist:
oTHRUST RATING PANEL......................... Upon reaching 250 knots, select: 757– 
CLB 2, 767 – CLB
 On the 757, when the rate of climb falls below approximately 1000 feet 
per minute, select “CLB 1” or “CLB”, as appropriate.
Recommendation:  Enter Climb Speeds during FMC loading right after takeoff data (write the 
numbers on Normal Procedures checklist - the bottom of the first panel is a good spot).  
  Aircraft     Weight      Speed
  757, 767-200 and 767-300  up to 300,000 lbs     300 kts / M .80
  767-300     above 300 to 350,000 lbs   310 kts / M .80
  767-300      above 350 to 408,000 lbs   320 kts / M .80
Non-Pegasus - See Systems 65.7:  Climb (CLB) Page:  This page will display a non-
restricted 250 knot climb to 10,000 feet, unless intervening speed or altitudes had been 
previously entered.
Pegasus - VNAV Page - See Systems 66.14:  The VNAV Key displays CLB, CRZ and DES 
pages.  Pressing VNAV on the ground, during takeoff, or climb shows the CLB page.  The 
only difference on the CLB page is the title. Speed displays the type of climb, e.g., V2 + 20, 
250
#2 - NON-STANDARD AFTER LANDING – TAXI CHECKLIST - 27 OCCURRENCES
 Examples from MLC comments: 
  “CA turning autobrake sw. to off on taxi-in - debriefed.” 
  “Reached down and manually turned off autobrake selector while on 
  landing rollout.” 
  “Crew threw a couple of switches on the parking checklist, while 
  taxiing.” 
“F/O did not notice that Capt. had not turned strobe lights off after 
landing and announced checklist complete.” 
“Flaps not left at 20 degrees after approach in icing conditions.” 
“APU non-std. start” 
“FO reaches over and turns off the auto brakes switch while the aircraft
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is still on the centerline of the runway. Capt. had already overridden the 
autobrakes well before this.” 
“FO starts after landing (directed by CA) as we came up to hold short 
24L (land 24R). FO head down till we stopped at RWY.” 
“Remember - the flight is not over until the parking checklist is 
complete and the cockpit door is locked on the way out
 With the exception of the Autopilots (which are normal runway items) no other item 
on this checklist should be accomplished until clear of runway. 
 Autobrake selector should not be turned off until the Parking Checklist flow as 
accomplished by the Captain.  Do not reach down while on the runway or 
taxiing to turn off the switch.
 Both pilots will monitor the appropriate tower frequency when number one in 
position to cross an active runway. Anytime the aircraft is cleared to hold short 
of or cross an active runway, the Captain and FO will verbally confirm the 
clearance with each other.
 Icing Conditions - Flap Policy FLAPS... RETRACT to 20.  Advise station by radio, if 
possible, or upon reaching gate position, of the need for a check of the flap area. 
Deicing personnel or flight crew must check the inboard flap wells for snow, ice, or 
slush accumulation.  Prior to next departure, any snow, slush, or ice accumulation 
will be removed by deicing before retracting the flaps.
 Engine Cooldown Period For the 757, allow 1 minute after landing before shutting 
down the engine to permit the hot section to thermally stabilize. For the 767, allow 
at least 3 minutes after landing before shutting the engine down for cooldown. Use 
a thrust setting no higher than that normally used for taxi.
 APU should normally be started 2 minutes prior to gate arrival to allow engines to 
be shut down upon gate arrival, and to provide pneumatic pressure for proper 
closing of the engine bleed valves.
 When all items have been accomplished, the First Officer will advise – “After 
landing checklist complete.”
#3 - NON-STANDARD STANDARDIZED DESCENT SPEED COMPLIANCE - 22 
OCCURENCES
 Examples from MLC comments: 
  “Did not enter STD descent SPDS” 
  “Did not use STD descent speeds - debriefed.” 
“Descended at 265 kts, did not notice mach to IAS changeover - did 
slow to 250 KIAS @ 10K - that’s where they noticed.” 
“Programed and flew 320 kt. descend.  Was not trying to make up time 
(no discussion of this).  FLT was ARR MCO for shutdown for the night.” 
“No ATC speeds given - Capt. flew other than standard speed.”
 On Cruise Checklist:  MINIMUM DESCENT SPEED...CHECK
oVerify minimum descent speed (cruise mach / 290 knots in domestic airspace) is 
entered in FMC. 
 Standardized Descent Speed Policy:  
oAt domestic stations use cruise mach, then 290 knots as a planned descent speed.
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o Use this speed rather than Cost Index generated descent speeds.  If another speed 
is desired, coordinate with ATC.  
oOutside domestic airspace, consider an optimum (CI generated) descent speed into 
those destinations where experience and judgment indicate no ATC conflict. 
Enter this speed into the FMC before descent.
#4 - NON-STANDARD STARTING ENGINES CHECKLIST - 18 OCCURRENCES 
 Examples from MLC comments: 
“CA & FO mistakenly believe CTR FUEL PUMPS could remain OFF until 
after takeoff if center tank quantity is less than 5000 LBS, turn on at 
cruise. Debriefed, to follow CL, turn pumps on before engine start, to 
ensure pumps operate after engine start and before take-off.” 
“Did not have proper response to a couple of checklist items.” 
“Checklist - pressurization - auto - set - landing altitude was not 
correctly set.  FO caught it during cruise.” 
“Hydraulic pumps were turned on ‘left to right’ instead of ‘right to left’.” 
“All 3 IRUs not checked on BSC.” 
“Captain airspeed bugs incorrectly set.  Set Ref 20, not V2 + 20.” 
“FO/FB - inserted 4 digit APU hour meter reading in ACARS, Pegasus 
FMS, instead of 3 digits + A/D.  Both for Dept. and Arrival.”
 CDU...SET and CHECKED means that PERF page/ T/O page agree w/TPS, CDU data 
agree with clearance and that Pre-departure clearance route has been properly entered.
 APU Hourmeter - PEGASUS aircraft - INDEX 1/2 – MESSAGES – STATUS – APU HOURS 
– Enter last 3-digits of the APU hourmeter followed by A for arrival or D for 
departure. Sent automatically. 
 FUEL PUMPS…ON: If center tank contains fuel: Turn switches on, regardless of 
quantity.  Verify both Center Tank Fuel Pump Low PRESS lights are illuminated and CTR 
L FUEL PUMP and CTR R FUEL PUMP EICAS messages are displayed.
 HYDRAULIC PUMPS...ON / AUTO: Pressurize Right System first to prevent fluid 
transfer.
o757 - Electric Pump Switches (R, C, & L) – ON - Center No. 2 PRESS light will be 
illuminated until an engine is started.  Engine Pump Switches – Check ON
o767 - Demand Pump Selectors (R, C, & L) – AUTO Primary Pump Switches – ON - 
Center No. 2 PRESS Light will be illuminated
 Do not release brakes until doors are closed and the groundman and do not release 
brakes until doors are closed and the groundman and Ramp/Ground Control have 
cleared the aircraft to push.
 When all items have been accomplished, the First Officer will advise the Captain – 
“Before Starting Engines checklist complete.” 
#5 - NON-STANDARD BEFORE TAKEOFF CHECKLIST - 17 OCCURRENCES 
 Examples from MLC comments: 
  “Captain did not brief ‘hot spots’ along planned taxi routing.” 
“Captain displayed complacency with respect to CRM and D & R - 
briefings were minimal, less than what we would consider normal for a 
crew that is paired together regularly.  LAS eng. out was touched on
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 but not briefed, taxi out and taxi in routes not briefed.  Captain 
wascompletely debriefed with respect to these requirements.” 
“No taxi route brief.”
“I did not hear the crew discuss the E/O NOTAM procedure for the 
departure RWY.” 
“Capt. Pre. Dept. brief could have included more about obstacle & wx. 
avoidance.” 
“Capt. did not brief expected taxi out route, FO had to go heads down 
to check (pull out of book) the DFW standard taxi routes.”
“The TPS had 4R as the top RWY of the 5.  The actual takeoff RWY was 
RWY09.  The FMC loads 4R which the crew properly changed to 
RWY09.  Then the closeout came which “reset” the FMC takeoff page to 
RWY 4R.  TPS had 64C setting while RWY 09 requires 59C.  Neither pilot 
caught the fact that they had too little power for takeoff on the shorter 
RWY 09.  The check airmen had to stop the crew from taking off and 
have them correct the takeoff power to the proper setting in the FMC.  
The check airman busted the crew’s domestic quals.”
 Non-standard response to checklist items was noted in reference to entire checklist
 MAP DISPLAY... CHECKED, RUNWAY ___‡ BOTH CAPTAIN AND FO MUST RESPOND 
“Checked, Runway ___”
oSet HSI/ND to 10 NM range in MAP mode if conducting RNAV SID. 
oVerify correct runway is displayed for takeoff. If re-selection of runway is 
necessary, SID and transition must then be re-selected if conducting RNAV 
SID.
oVerify accuracy of aircraft symbol position relative to runway is acceptable. 
Accuracy is acceptable when approaching number one position prior to takeoff, 
the apex of the airplane symbol (triangle) appears it will fall between the two lines 
that depict the runway symbol
oIf FMC accuracy cannot be verified, select Terrain System Override (TERR 
OVRD) until FMC position is updated and do not conduct an RNAV SID.
 T. O. PA.......................COMPLETED
oThe Captain will make the takeoff PA no less than two minutes prior to takeoff, 
"Flight Attendants prepare for takeoff"
oWhen takeoff is imminent, chime the cabin by rapidly cycling the NO SMOKING 
Switch once. 
 Wing Illumination, Runway Turnoff Light and Taxi Light when taking position on the runway 
for takeoff
 Just prior to initiating takeoff roll LIGHTS ...ON – All other lights on.  Landing lights and 
white anti-collision lights may be left off if reduced visibility causes scatterback.
#6 - NON-STANDARD BEFORE TAXI/TAXI CHECKLIST - 16 OCCURRENCES
 Examples from MLC comments: 
  “Set T/O flaps late.” 
  “Debriefed F/O on missing EICAS ‘recall’ on taxi checklist.” 
“FO announced ‘Before Taxi Checklist Completed’ before aircraft 
movement in ramp area.” “Due to Captain not calling for Before Taxi 
Checklist, F.O. moved the flaps while aircraft was in motion in ramp.”
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 “Crew conducted flight control check while in ramp area.”
 FLAPS...SET for TAKEOFF: After pushback, select flaps for T/O prior to releasing 
parking brake for taxi. Flaps need not be indicating the T/O position for taxi. Do not 
delay taxi for transitioning flaps. 
 Accomplish Before Taxi items from memory by using a flow pattern prior to brake release 
for taxi. 
 No “Before Taxi Checklist Complete” call is required.  
 FLIGHT CONTROLS...CHECKED - Check flight controls when clear of ramp area.
 EICAS…RECALL - Press RECALL Switch on the CAUTION CANCEL / RECALL Panel. 
Check that no system failures are displayed. Press CANCEL Switch (if required).
 Verify accomplishment of Before Taxi and Taxi items by reference to the Taxi checklist 
when clear of the ramp area. Saying  “Taxi Checklist Complete” confirms the completion 
of both checklists.
#7 - NON-STANDARD PARKING CHECKLIST - 16 OCCURRENCES
 Examples from MLC comments: 
  “Arrival P.A. too early” 
  “F/O did arrival PA prior to aircraft coming to a complete stop at the 
  gate.” 
“IRS’s turned off by Captain immediately upon gate arrival, before the 
checklist calls for them to be shut down and before the groundspeed 
and drift rate could be checked.” 
  “757 HYD pump (R to L) parking checklist.” 
  “HYD panel ‘off’, ‘set; is proper response.” 
  “FOs parking scan and items out of order.”
  “No ‘Checklist Complete’ called.”
 Arrival PA made by the FO immediately after gate arrival – aircraft stopped at the gate.  
CAPTAINS: PLEASE WAIT TO TURN OFF THE SEATBELT SIGN UNTIL YOUR FO 
HAS COMPLETED THIS PA!!
 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM...SET: Depressurize right system last to prevent fluid transfer 
between systems. 
 IRUs...CHECKED / OFF: Accomplish an End of Flight Accuracy Check after flights 
exceeding 60 minutes block to block time.
oCaptain will check residual ground speed. If any residual ground speed exceeds 15 
knots: Make an E6 entry.
oFirst Officer will check radial position error tolerance thirty seconds after last 
engine is shut down.
 If the error rate for any IRU is:
• Greater than 3.0 nm / hr for flights with block-to-block time less 
than eight hours
• Greater than 2.0 nm / hr for flights with block-to-block time eight 
hours or more or flights To/From Hawaii
oIf an E6 entry is required because of excessive radial position or ground speed error 
for any unit, E6 entry should include block-to-block flight time, radial position 
error, and ground speed error for all three systems. Use FMR CODE 3444. Do 
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not turn the IRU Switches OFF. The IRUs should be left on for Maintenance.
 When all items have been accomplished, the First Officer will advise the Captain – 
“Parking checklist complete.”
#8 - NON-STANDARD TAKEOFF BRIEFING: TAXI ROUTE, HOT SPOTS, SID, FM 
II SPECIAL PROCEDURES, ENGINE OUT, TERRAIN CONSIDERATIONS 
(MEA,MSA,GRID MORA), TRANSITION ALTITUDE - 15 OCCURRENCES
 Examples from MLC comments: 
  “Captain did not brief ‘hot spots’ along planned taxi routing.” 
  “Did not do.” 
“Captain displayed complacency with respect to CRM and D & R - 
briefings were minimal, less than what we would consider normal for a 
crew that is paired together regularly.  LAS eng. out was touched on 
but not briefed, taxi out and taxi in routes not briefed.  Captain was 
completely debriefed with respect to these requirements.” 
“No taxi route brief.” 
“I did not hear the crew discuss the E/O NOTAM procedure for the 
departure RWY.” 
“Capt. Pre. Dept. brief could have included more about obstacle & wx. 
avoidance.” 
“Capt. did not brief expected taxi out route, FO had to go heads down 
to check (pull out of book) the DFW standard taxi routes.”
 The takeoff briefing will be conducted by the Captain (or at the Captainʼs discretion, the 
Pilot-Flying) at the gate and include, as a minimum:
oDesignate the pilot-flying
oRejected takeoff considerations
oAnd if appropriate:
 Departure procedure (required only if not covered previously by checklist 
completion or if revised by ATC) including Transition Altitude 
 Airport specific engine failure profile – 10-9 page, NOTAM
 Takeoff alternate
 Takeoff weather conditions
 Runway surface conditions
 Terrain considerations (MEA, MSA, Grid MORA)
 Any other variables associated with the taxi (Route, Standard Taxi 
Routes & Hot Spots) and takeoff
#9 - NON-STANDARD CRUISE CHECKLIST - 14 OCCURRENCES
 Examples from MLC comments: 
  “No ‘Checklist Complete’ called.”
“Captain was PM and did not have checklist out.  While most of the 
items on the cruise and descent checklist were accomplished, some 
were not.  I strongly emphasized the use of checklists.  Some Captains 
out there think they are just for F/Os.”
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“Capt. was PM and did not use checklist during these checks, nor did 
he call them ‘complete’.  Emphasized strongly in debrief.” 
  “Did not complete cruise checklist in timely manner - slow to log RVSM 
  - debriefed.”
  “Transponder alt reporting not correct OM.”
 AIRPLANE PERFORMANCE...CHECKED: After transitioning to cruise flight, verify 
(check) aircraft is performing as expected (e.g., airspeed, thrust, etc.).
 ALTIMETERS (RVSM Airspace only)...CHECK / RECORD 
oWhen level in RVSM airspace, record the Captain, FO, and Standby Altimeter 
readings. 
oIn RVSM airspace, transponder altitude reporting source should be selected to 
the altimeter closest to the assigned altitude. This will ensure that ATC 
receives the same information that the aircraft is using for an altitude source.
 The PM will use the checklist to verify that all items have been accomplished. Any 
item that cannot be verified as having been accomplished will require a challenge and 
response. 
 When all items have been accomplished, the Pilot-Monitoring will advise – “Cruise 
checklist complete.”
#10 - NON-STANDARD FMS ROUTE/LEGS VERIFICATION CHECK - 12 
OCCURRENCES: 
 Examples from MLC comments: 
  “Did not check glass against paper SID during legs check.” 
  “Read waypoints from CDU not from HSI.” 
  “Did not do.”
“Captain did not perform FMC route/leg verification properly.  
Debriefed.  Although FO knew the correct procedure, he did not feel the 
need to speak up (more) forcibly.” 
“The crew read the fixes from the paper FP to the FMC while the other 
pilot checked them in proper sequence and stepped through them.  No 
route check ever done.”
  “Legs check was accomplished page at a time rather than stepping 
  through fix at a time."
 CDU...SET and CHECKED: Check the Pre-Departure Clearance (PDC) route vs. the Flight 
Plan.
Route Verification Check:  After ACARS route up-link, or manual route loading, 
waypoint names will be displayed and verified by both pilots. One pilot will read 
waypoint names from the Navigation Display (HSI/ND) while the other pilot 
checks them against the flight plan or current ATC clearance.
Legs Verification Check: plan and / or ATC clearance is entered and that all points 
are connected by a solid magenta line. A crosscheck of each flight plan leg, as 
displayed on the HSI, must be made against each leg of the computer flight plan so 
any deviation or unusual heading change is readily apparent. One pilot will read the 
HSI display, while the other pilot checks it against the SID, flight plan or ATC 
clearance. This also ensures that no leg or waypoint has been omitted.
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 HSI Mode 
Selector................................................................................PLAN
 HSI Range Selector..................................................................AS 
DESIRED 
 LEGS Key.......................................................................................... 
PRESS
 Using the MAP CTR STEP prompt [ 5R ], step through and read 
each waypoint from the center of the HSI screen to the other pilot 
who verifies the waypoint from the left hand margin of the flight 
plan.
oNOTE:  When conducting an RNAV SID, the check must be made using the 
Jeppesen paper copy of the SID, including any SID transitions. 
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